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Abstract. This note analyzes whether international material input structures have converged 
or diverged over time. Pooled variances for 25 industries were obtained from OECD input-
output tables in constant prices for nine countries over the period 1971-1990. It is found that 
high-tech industries were mainly characterized by divergence of material input structures, 
whereas convergence was found for many low-tech, more mature industries. In line with 
studies on  (labor) productivity growth rates, convergence of material input structures was 
prevalent in the 1970s, while divergence dominated in the 1980s.    
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1. Introduction 
 
Over the past couple of decades, globalization has become a keyword to describe the 
increased interrelatedness of nations with respect to trade and knowledge diffusion. The 
question we address in this note is how production processes of industrialized countries have 
changed as a consequence of international economic and technological linkages. Using 
information from input-output tables, we analyze for each industry whether the structures of 
material inputs have converged, or not.  
Differences between countries with respect to changes in material input structures as 
observable from input-output tables can be attributed to two phenomena. First, trade does not 
only involve the exchange of manufactured goods, but also enhances the diffusion of 
technology (see, for instance, Coe & Helpman, 1995, and Verspagen, 1997). Technology 
flows from technological leaders to followers may induce  technological catch-up and hence a 
tendency to converge. However, in so-called “technology gap” models of growth (Fagerberg, 
1987), convergence will occur only if the effects of innovations by the leader  are smaller than 
the effects of catch-up through assimilation of diffused technology by follower countries. 
Otherwise, the technology gap will not narrow but may even widen.
1 Since material input 
structure is a characteristic of technologies operated by industries, convergence and 
divergence of material input structures can thus also be explained by technology gap 
arguments.
2  
  Second, trade theory predicts that countries will specialize in different production 
processes.
3 Input-output tables, however, are usually highly aggregated whereas specialization 
                                                
1   See Appendix A for a brief formal exposition of this issue. 
2   The issue of convergence of technologies has been studied quite extensively, but almost exclusively on the 
basis of trends in (labor or multifactor) productivity. Baumol (1986) is a classic contribution in this respect.  
3   In the Heckscher-Ohlin model, differences in factor endowments cause specialization in certain industries, 
which then gives rise to interindustry trade (Jones, 1956). On the other hand, the new trade theories explain   3
takes place at the level of subindustries, each of which can be characterized by its own 
material input structure. Once the subindustries are aggregated into an industry, the 
subindustries in which a country is specialized will have a larger share. Because countries 
specialize in different subindustries, this will induce increasing differences in the country-
specific shares of subindustries within an industry over time. This will cause a tendency 
towards divergence of material input structures at the industry level. 
The theories above emphasize different aspects of international trade and it is not at all 
clear how the material input structures will change. Empirical analyses should provide 
answers to the question whether convergence or divergence  prevails.
4 In this note we propose 
the reduction in the pooled variance of the material input coefficients of an industry as an 
indicator of convergence. In this vein, we study the OECD input-output tables in constant 





We base our analysis on input-output tables in constant prices. From these, we obtain the 
elements  ij z  with the (domestic plus imported) intermediate deliveries from industry i to 
industry  j ( i,  j = 1,…,n) and domestic gross outputs  j x  in industry j. The elements 
j ij ij x z a / =  denote the input coefficients of material input i per unit of output in industry j. 
Convergence (respectively divergence) of material input structures in industry j would imply 
that the jth columns of the matrices A of input coefficients for the various countries become 
more (respectively less) similar. In line with the well-known concept of σ -convergence, we 
                                                                                                                                                   
empirically observed intra-industry trade as a result of specialization within industries as caused by, for 
example, scale economies (Krugman, 1981) or imperfect competition (Grossman, 1992). 
4   A first study along these lines is contained in Hoen (2002, Chapter 7).   4
analyze the changes in the variability of the columns over time. 
  Let the countries be denoted by the index r = 1,…, t m  and note that the number of 
countries included in the sample differs over time. Then for each industry j (= 1,…,n) at time 
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If  ) 1 ( + t v j  is “substantially” smaller than  ) (t v j , we will speak of convergence between 
period t and t+1. Analogously, we will take a  ) 1 ( + t v j  that is “substantially” larger than  ) (t v j  
as an indication of divergence between t and t+1. As a yardstick, we use the corresponding F-
statistic. For example (also other percentiles will be used), 
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It should be stressed that we use the critical values of the F-distribution only as a yardstick to 
distinguish between “large” and “small” differences. The application of an F-test to decide 
whether the differences are significantly different (in a statistical sense), would require 
unrealistically strong assumptions. That is, we would have to assume that the observations   5
) (t a
r
ij  are normally distributed with mean  ) (t i µ  and a common variance  ) (
2 t σ . Moreover, 
the observations would need to be independent across countries r and input industries i. In 
particular the assumption regarding independency seems to be violated in reality, because 





We studied the changes in material input structures in the way outlined in the previous section 
on the basis of a set of national input-output tables compiled by the OECD (OECD, 1995). It 
contains input-output tables for ten developed countries, using a 35-industry classification.
5  
For each country, three to five tables are available, roughly for the period 1968-1990. 
Unfortunately, the years for which tables are compiled do not exactly coincide. We decided to 
follow the suggestion made in OECD (1995) to assign each table to a subperiod. Table 1 
presents this grouping of tables.
6  
 
INSERT TABLE 1 
 
Our analyses are based on the tables that contain all intermediate inputs, both domestically 
produced and imported (in the OECD database these tables are encoded as “TIOK”). This 
choice is in accordance with the idea that material input structures should resemble 
                                                
5   These countries are Australia (AU), Canada (CA), Denmark (DK), France (FR), Germany (GE), Japan (JP), 
The Netherlands (NL), the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States of America (US). The OECD 
database also contains a single table for Italy. Since changes in tables are considered, we could not include 
Italy in our analysis.   6
technologies of industries. Mere changes in the mix of domestically produced and imported 
inputs should not affect these representations. Further, the interindustry transactions recorded 
in the tables for any country are all denominated in the national currency for a base year. 
Hence, inflation and changes in relative prices hardly affect the composition of the 
intermediate inputs. 
Since national statistical agencies did not construct their national input-output tables 
in exactly the same way, the OECD tables are not fully comparable. Some industries are not 
contained as separate entities in tables for some countries, whereas they do for others (see 
OECD, 1995, p. 12). To make the tables as comparable as possible we had to aggregate a 
limited number of industries. The aggregation scheme is included in Appendix B. We finally 
computed the pooled variances for 25 industries, each of them based on material input 





Applying equations (1) and (2) to the OECD (1995) tables and using the specified criteria for 
convergence and divergence, yields the results documented in Table 2. The rightmost 
columns refer to trends over the entire period of analysis, i.e. 1971-1990. An overwhelming 
majority of industries (i.e., 19 out of 25) has experienced either convergence or divergence of 
material input structures, as measured by the yardstick of the 10
th, respectively the 90
th, 
percentiles of the appropriate F-distributions.  
 
INSERT TABLE 2 
                                                                                                                                                   
6   We decided to adopt the grouping suggested by OECD (1995, p. 7), except for one table. That is, we included 
UK(1979) in the third subperiod, whereas OECD (1995) assigned it to the second subperiod. Our grouping   7
 
 
In particular, many manufacturing industries that are widely considered as “low-tech” –  such 
as textiles (4), wood products (5), paper (6), petroleum (8), and basic metals (11) – appear to 
have converged. Convergence is also found for primary industries – agriculture (1) and 
mining (2) – and for a limited number of services industries. A possible, and admittedly 
somewhat speculative, explanation is that innovation by technological leaders has slowed 
down in these “mature” industries. The technology gap will thus be narrowed if the ability of 
follower countries to assimilate diffused technology has not decreased. This would yield 
clearcut tendencies towards convergence of the material input structures, as mentioned in the 
introduction. Further, low innovation rates are in line with limited product differentiation, and 
hence with a relatively stable intra-industry trade pattern. The tendency of divergence due to 
enhanced specialization will thus be absent. 
  The results for most high-tech and medium-tech manufacturing industries support this 
tentative explanation. Most industries that belong to this group – such as chemicals (7), 
plastics (9), machinery (13), ships (14), and transport equipment, (15) – show either 
divergence or no discernible tendency. An increase of the leaders’ innovation rates will widen 
the technology gap inducing divergence, if abilities to assimilate knowledge remain unaltered. 
Further, industries – such as metal products (12) and business services (24) – that are 
characterized by a high degree of product differentiation, which may be taken as an indication  
of specialization, have diverged over time.  
It should be noted, however, that we are not able to explain the findings for every 
industry. For example, the low-tech industry glass and stone (10) shows divergence, whereas 
the high-tech industry instruments (16) is found to have experienced convergent tendencies. 
  Not surprisingly, the results for shorter subperiods reveal a far more heterogeneous 
pattern than the results for the entire period. The bottom row shows that an initial tendency 
                                                                                                                                                   
yields less variance within groups with respect to timing.    8
towards convergence was gradually overturned. In the late 1980s, divergence rather than 
convergence of material input structures was found most often. This result is in line with 
studies that focus on convergence and divergence of labor productivity levels (see, e.g., 
Bernard & Jones, 1996a, 1996b, and  Los & Timmer, 2003). From the perspective of single 
industries, only few show a more or less persistent development, such as agriculture (1), ships 
(14), other manufacturing (17), utilities (18) and government services (25). For the other 
industries, it is remarkable that subperiods with convergence are often followed by subperiods 
of divergence (and vice versa). These counteracting short-run effects certainly call for further 
analysis at a more detailed industry level. At the present level, they seem to have blurred the 





This note explored opportunities to incorporate changing patterns of material input structures 
into analyses of international convergence and divergence. For the period 1971-1990, the 
analysis based on pooled variances of input coefficients revealed that high-tech industries 
were mainly characterized by divergence of material input structures, whereas convergence 
was found for many low-tech, more mature industries. Some tentative explanations for this 
result were put forward. As is in line with studies that focus on convergence and divergence 
of (labor) productivity growth rates, convergence of material input structures was prevalent in 
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Appendix A: Technology gap models and convergence 
 
In traditional neoclassical economics (Solow, 1956), international differences in levels of 
labor productivity were seen as transitory phenomena. Due to more attractive rates of return to 
capital in low-productivity countries, investment rates were thought to be higher than in high-
productivity countries. Ultimately, all countries will tend towards the same productivity level. 
If (exogenous) technological progress is taken into account (countries increase their 
productivity at a constant pace), convergence towards a steady-state gap of productivity levels 
will result, and growth rates will tend to equalize. Characteristic of these models is that 
technology is considered to be common to all countries. Differences in savings rates are 
considered the main cause of productivity growth differentials. 
In the technology gap literature (Fagerberg, 1987), a different approach is proposed. 
High-productivity countries attain productivity growth by means of innovation. Since the 
knowledge pertaining to these innovations is assumed to disseminate slowly (or, at least, not 
instantaneously), low-productivity countries will initially lose ground, both in terms of 
productivity levels and growth rates. As soon as low-productivity countries start to “benefit” 
from their technological backwardness (for instance, by imitating high-productivity processes 
and products) catch-up can occur. Thus, the dynamics of the productivity gap between high-
productivity countries and low-productivity countries is basically viewed as the outcome of 
two opposing forces: innovation by the leaders and assimilation by followers. 
Let us for simplicity assume that there is just one productivity leader, country 0. The 
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where dots denote growth rates and the superscript INI indicates a value in the initial period. y 
stands for productivity. The constants α i (i=0,...,n) and β i (i=1,...,n) denote country-specific 
abilities to innovate (α i≥ 0), and abilities to assimilate technology that originated with the 
leader (β i≥ 0), respectively. Countries that are unable to assimilate any technology will be 
characterized by β i=0. The better country i is at assimilating (for instance due to a relatively 
well-educated workforce), the more negative β i will be. For reasons of exposition, let us 
assume that follower countries cannot innovate at all by themselves (α i=0, i=1,...,n). 
If we assume that the leader’s ability to innovate leads to a stable, continuous flow of 
innovations that yields productivity growth at rate α 0, the equilibrium gaps for the 
productivity levels can easily be found by setting the left hand side of (A1) equal to zero, that 
is -in equilibrium- the leader and the followers experience identical productivity growth rates. 








0 =                ( A 2 )  
 
Thus, the equilibrium gaps for productivity levels are larger the faster innovations arrive in 
the leader country and the smaller are the rates of assimilation in follower countries.  
In many cases, productivity growth rates due to innovation as captured by α 0 are not 
stable over time (see, e.g. Freeman & Soete, 1997). In the early stages of product life cycles, 
productivity growth is often slow (α 0 small), due to the initially limited scale at which 
innovated processes are used or innovated products are sold. Later on, productivity growth 
picks up (α 0↑ ), at the time the innovation has gained more popularity. Finally, at the time 
processes and products reach the stage of maturity, the rate of innovation usually goes down 
(α 0↓ ), because opportunities for further improvement get fished out. If it is assumed that the   13
abilities to assimilate remain constant over time, the product life cycle can be held responsible 
for changes in the distribution of gaps, as reflected in its variance. The variance of equilibrium 
gaps is likely to increase (σ -divergence) during the transition from the early stage to the stage 
of growth. During the subsequent transition from the stage of growth to the maturity stage, 
however, the variance of equilibrium gaps could well decrease (σ -convergence). Since 
adaptation to the equilibrium distribution of gaps is generally considered as a slow process 
due to relatively modest abilities to assimilate, actual convergence and divergence processes 
are long-run phenomena.      14
Appendix B: Industry classification for analyses based on OECD (1995) data 
No.  Description  OECD IO code  ISIC Rev. 2 code 
1.  Agriculture, forestry and fishery   1  1 
2. Mining  and  quarrying  2  2 
3. Food,  beverage  and  tobacco  3  31 
4.  Textiles, apparel and leather  4  32 
5.  Wood products and furniture  5  33 
6.  Paper, paper products and printing  6  34 
7.  Chemicals, including drugs and medicines  7+8  351+352 
8. Petroleum  and  coal  products  9  353+354 
9.  Rubber and plastic products  10  355+356 
10.  Non-metallic mineral products  11  36 
11. Basic  metals  12+13  37 
12. Metal  products  14  381 
13.  Machinery, including electronics  15+16+17+18  382+383 
14. Shipbuilding  and  repairing  19  3841 
15. Other  transport  equipment  20+21+22  384-3841 
16. Professional  goods  23  385 
17. Other  manufacturing  24  39 
18.  Electricity, gas and water  25  4 
19. Construction  26  5 
20.  Wholesale and retail trade  27  61+62 
21.  Restaurants and hotels  28  63 
22.  Transport and storage services  29  71 
23. Communication  services  30  72 
24.  Financial and business services  31+32  8 
25.  Community, social and government services  33+34+35  9 
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Table 1: Availability and grouping of OECD tables* 
“1971”  AU(68)  CA(71)  DK(72)  FR(72)   JP(70)  NL(72)  UK(68)  US(72) 
“1976”  AU(74)  CA(76)  DK(77)  FR(77)  GE(78)  JP(75)  NL(77)   US(77) 
“1980”   CA(81)  DK(80)  FR(80)   JP(80)  NL(81)  UK(79)  US(82) 
“1985”  AU(86)  CA(86)  DK(85)  FR(85)  GE(86)  JP(85)  NL(86)  UK(84)  US(85) 
“1990”  AU(89)  CA(90)  DK(90)  FR(90)  GE(90)  JP(90)   UK(90)  US(90) 
* First column contains labels for subperiods. Values between parentheses refer to years.   16
Table 2. Results for the OECD tables, 1971-1990. 
Industry  71-76   76-80   80-85   85-90   71-90   
1 0.695  C***  1.072   0.714 C**  0.823 C*  0.438 C*** 
2  0.970   0.769 C**  0.746 C**  1.408 D***  0.783 C* 
3  0.791 C*  1.219   0.730 C**  1.190   0.838  
4  1.072   0.774 C*  1.283 D*  0.709 C***  0.755 C** 
5 0.587  C***  1.263 D**  0.686 C***  1.243 D*  0.632 C*** 
6  1.042   1.113   0.655 C***  1.084   0.824 C* 
7  1.406 D**  0.910   0.696 C***  1.147   1.020  
8  0.918   0.219 C***  4.328 D***  0.422 C***  0.367 C*** 
9  0.747 C**  1.023   0.988   1.504 D***  1.136  
10  0.969   1.119   0.938   1.203   1.223 D* 
11  0.969   0.362 C***  1.194   1.033   0.433  C*** 
12  1.074   0.918   1.257 D*  1.093   1.354 D** 
13  1.033   0.940   0.759 C**  2.180 D***  1.606 D*** 
14  1.109   1.337 D**  1.265 D*  1.563 D***  2.934 D*** 
15 1.928  D***  0.778 C*  1.086   1.363 D**  2.220 D*** 
16  0.965   0.792 C*  0.946   0.984   0.711 C** 
17  0.845 C*  0.771 C*  0.849   0.807 C*  0.446 C*** 
18  0.761 C**  0.770 C**  0.991   1.052   0.611 C*** 
19  0.882   1.862 D***  0.796 C*  1.104   1.444 D*** 
20  1.174   0.548 C***  1.187   1.094   0.836   
21  0.738 C**  0.574 C***  1.457 D***  0.979   0.604 C*** 
22  0.810 C*  0.826   1.157   1.152   0.892  
23 0.523  C***  0.985   1.094   1.483 D***  0.837  
24 0.559  C***  1.362 D**  0.616 C***  2.847 D***  1.336 D** 
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Notes. 
C: convergence, *, **, *** indicates that the observed ratio is smaller than the 10th, 5th, or 
1st percentile, respectively, of the corresponding F-distribution. 
D: divergence, *, **, *** indicates that the observed ratio is larger than the 90th, 95th, or 99th 
percentile, respectively, of the corresponding F-distribution. 
 